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Abstract 
For the countries of southern Africa, regional cooperation and integration are preconditions for acceler-
ated economic and social development. On their own, the southern African economies, most of them 
small, agriculture based primary commodity exporters with only incipient industrial development, will 
not be able to attract the necessary financial and technology transfers  to support a sustained industrialisa-
tion process. 
In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), some of the necessary conditions for en-
hanced economic and social development have been met. The SADC Trade Protocol has been in effect 
since September 2000, providing for the establishment of a free-trade area in the course of the coming 
decade. In other core areas, including development of cross-border infrastructures, food security, or pro-
tection of natural resources, major advances have been achieved through sectoral cooperation. However, 
the path towards achieving a unified economic space in the region will prove to be still a long one. 
SADC will have to develop into a regional organization with true supranational institutions endowed with 
far reaching decision-making competences. Strengthening the organization hinges on the political will of 
its member countries – and this will is not always uniform and clear-cut. SADC member countries’ diver-
gent economic and social development, widespread poverty, low productivity and persistent belligerent 
conflicts in the region represent serious impediments for deeper integration. The role of the region's "lo-
comotive", South Africa, is ambiguous: fearing job losses and pursuing its own priorities, the country has 
thus far shown only limited  inclination to come to terms with the rest of the region. 
Development cooperation can contribute to deepen integration in the region only if member countries 
have the political resolve to transfer substantial sovereign powers to the regional institutions. Existing 
reform proposals must be implemented speedily; in that context, the role of the SADC Secretariat as the 
organization’s principal policy formulation and coordination institution must be strengthened. German 
development cooperation should focus on support to SADC Trade Protocol implementation, private sec-
tor promotion, infrastructure development in selected areas, and protection of natural resources. 
Regional integration in southern Africa will only be successful if other goals are achieved in tandem, 
including political and economic stabilization of the region, mobilization of savings and investment, and a 
gradual integration of the region into the world markets. The establishment of regional funds could con-
tribute to economic harmonization and social cohesion and help to overcome supply-side bottlenecks in 
the SADC region. Here, harnessing its own experience, the EU could assume the role of "leading donor". 
Negotiations between EU and SADC in the context of the recent Cotonou Agreement could provide a 
chance for the EU to assume such a new role. 
The present study examines the state and the development perspectives of SADC and discusses ap-
proaches for future development cooperation. 
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1 From functional cooperation to 
regional integration: SADC's 
evolution since the 1980s 
Regional cooperation and integration are neces-
sary conditions for any accelerated economic and 
social development of the countries of southern 
Africa. On their own, and under the conditions of 
globalized financial markets and technological 
developments, the economies of the region, 
marked as they are by agricultural structures, raw-
material exports, and only incipient industrial 
development, would have little chance to attract 
the technology and the financial transfers they 
need to catch up. This process can be facilitated if 
the countries open up to form an enlarged eco-
nomic space through trade integration and har-
monization of regulatory environments, and if 
they create the economic and social conditions 
required for structural modernization, in particular 
via institutional and market-related reforms, infra-
structure development, human resources devel-
opment, and a strengthening of social capital. 
Compared with other regional organizations, the 
Southern African Development Community, first 
established as the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 and 
reconceptualized in 1992 on the basis of the 
Treaty of Windhoek, has proven relatively suc-
cessful. When SADCC was founded, the approach 
adopted centered on a functionally specialized and 
project-oriented development cooperation among 
the so-called Frontline States, which constituted a 
political and economic counterweight to South 
Africa under apartheid. In the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the SADCC countries went through a 
process of democratic change and implemented a 
number of market-oriented reforms. Development 
problems faced by the member countries then 
were of a similar nature and called for cooperation 
and joint approaches to development in broad 
areas (e.g. infrastructure, food security, migration, 
drought). 
Since the enlargement of SADC to include its 
today fourteen member states1, and with the or-
ganization entering the phase marked by creation 
of a free-trade area and the deepening of regional 
integration, the integration process has become 
more demanding. The economic potential but also 
the structural and political heterogeneity among 
the member countries grew enormously when 
South Africa and the DR Congo joined the Com-
munity. The political situation is unstable, marked 
by both open and latent conflicts and by contro-
versy between member states. Moreover, the pres-
sures engendered by an incipient world-market 
integration have tended to operate more in the 
direction of divergence than integration.  
SADC is now in the initial stage of deeper re-
gional integration, viz. development aimed at 
forming a single economic space. Trade liberali-
zation among SADC member states has started 
with the launching of the SADC Trade Protocol 
on September 1 2000, and a free-trade area shall 
be created within the next decade. In November 
2000, the Council of Ministers has approved sub-
stantial reform proposals for the organization's 
institutional structures. At an extraordinary sum-
mit in Windhoek in March 2001 the Heads of 
State and Governments finally agreed on the most 
important reforms to strengthen SADC as a su-
pranational organization in charge of the eco-
nomic, political and social dimensions of the re-
gion's integration process. According to the re-
forms, which are to be realized over the next two 
years, the SADC Secretariat shall be strengthened, 
and SADC's sectoral structures and programmes 
will be rationalised. Viewed in these terms, it 
would be important for SADC to initiate coura-
geous steps aimed at bringing about political sta-
bilization, a balanced distribution of the costs and 
benefits of integration, and to swiftly implement 
the organizational reforms this calls for. 
                                                     
1 The present 14 member states are Angola, Botswana, 
DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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2 Experiences with regional-integration 
projects and lessons learnt 
In the 1960s and 1970s, under the impression of 
the rapid decline of raw-material real prices in the 
world markets and consequent terms of trade 
losses, many Latin American and African coun-
tries embarked a development strategy of import-
substituting industrialization flanked by regional-
cooperation projects. Adequate protective import 
barriers and a sufficient volume of domestic pur-
chasing power were seen as the most important 
preconditions of industrial development. In this 
view, regional integration was the means to de-
velop an internal market of the minimum size 
thought necessary to ensure cost digression and 
industrial division of labour.  
Except for the EU and EFTA, all regional-
integration projects failed in the 1970s. The fol-
lowing main reasons may be cited:2 
– The member countries were unable to agree 
on the distribution of the costs and benefits 
of pro-integration measures. 
– Mutual adjustment and assimilation of na-
tional trade regimes proved to be extremely 
difficult in administrative-technical terms. 
– Political and economic elites were unwill-
ing to forego the fiscal and private eco-
nomic benefits which they enjoyed under 
the regime of national trade protectionism. 
– The industrial projects of individual mem-
ber countries, protected from import com-
petition and highly subsidized, were un-
competitive and would have had to be re-
structured to be able to survive in a com-
mon market. National development policies 
were reluctant to reach agreement on this 
point. 
In view of the successful case of (ongoing) inte-
gration in the EU and in the wake of global inte-
gration, in particular of the GATT/WTO process, 
the 1990s experienced a surge of newly estab-
lished or revived organizations dedicated to re-
                                                     
2 Langhammer / Hiemenz (1990), p.74. 
gional integration. Many of these are supported by 
multilateral as well as bilateral development co-
operation. Today, quite in contrast to the import-
substituting industrialization policies of the 1960s 
and '70s, regional integration is seen as a path 
towards gradually liberalizing the trade of devel-
oping countries and integrating them into the 
world economy. The European Commission's 
mandate for the post Lomé negotiations,3 aimed at 
concluding reciprocal trade-preference agree-
ments with individual countries or regional free-
trade areas of ACP countries, provides support for 
this assessment. Moreover, Article 130u of the 
Maastricht Treaty calls, inter alia, for a harmoni-
ous, gradual integration of the developing coun-
tries into the world economy. 
As the more recent discussion has clearly pointed 
out, regional integration projects can alter loca-
tional factors in such a way as to make such sites 
more attractive for foreign direct investment and 
to encourage national private sector investment. 
For their part, foreign firms bring along the key 
means needed to achieve international competi-
tiveness: Modern technologies and management 
methods, export networks and knowledge of mar-
kets, and access to long-term credit. It must, how-
ever, be noted that recent empirical literature has 
also pointed to a number of necessary precondi-
tions that must be met within a region if these 
potentials are to be realized. The following factors 
may be considered prerequisites for successful 
regional integration in a sub-Saharan African con-
text: 
1. In sub-Saharan Africa, regional integration 
projects cannot succeed without infant-
industry tariff protection. These tariffs - which 
need to be selective and limited in time - are 
essential to easing the severe deficits in sys-
temic competitiveness currently constraining 
world market integration of SADC countries. 
Moreover, a moderate regime of protective 
                                                     
3 The Lomé Convention expired on February 29, 2000 and 
was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement which now al-
lows for reciprocity in trade preferences accorded be-
tween the EU and the ACP countries. 
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tariffs can provide an additional incentive for 
foreign direct investment.4 
2. Regional concentration processes in trade and 
investment need to be countered with struc-
tural support policies, and the countries made 
worse off by an initial integration round 
should be provided compensation for a transi-
tional phase. This in turn calls for sufficient 
and sustainable funding for such measures. 
3. The above-mentioned financial compensation 
mechanisms provided for through structural 
funds shared by the member states would be 
required to ease the pressure of national eco-
nomic imbalances (budgetary and current ac-
count) and to overcome political resistance to 
trade liberalization. Despite many wellknown 
shortcomings, structural funds have been an 
important means throughout the EU's integra-
tion process.  
4. In cases where the establishment of a regional 
customs regime implies substantial import 
liberalization, effective export promotion is 
needed to avoid imbalances. 
5. Trade integration has to be achieved swiftly, 
otherwise its effects are likely to fizzle out in 
the face of advancing worldwide integration 
within the WTO system and/or bilateral free-
trade agreements with third parties, such as 
the implementation of South Africa's free-
trade agreements with the EU and Brazil. 
6. Rapid achievement of intraregional trade 
preferences, including a comprehensive  dis-
mantling of non-tariff barriers to trade, would 
call for a speedy transition from a free-trade 
area to a customs union. 
                                                     
4 Oyejide (1996), p. 5f. 
3 Heterogeneity of the SADC countries 
As far as their surface area and population figures, 
the size of their domestic markets, the functional 
specialization of their economies, their per capita 
incomes, and their social and political situation 
are concerned, the SADC countries present a 
highly heterogeneous picture (see Table 1). The 
disparities in budgetary and current-account defi-
cits, savings and investment rates, foreign debt 
and dependence on external transfers are also 
sizable. Taken for itself, South Africa's share of 
the region's GDP amounts to over 70%. While 
over the last ten years the average per capita in-
come in South Africa has stagnated, declining by 
some 9% p.a. in wartorn Angola and DR Congo, 
incomes have risen by 3 to 4% p.a. in Botswana 
and Mauritius. The highest external debt, over 
200% of GDP, is noted for the DR Congo, Mo-
zambique, and Zambia. While a number of coun-
tries were able to limit inflation to one-digit levels 
prices have been rising by 30% p.a. and more in 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
In all, 40% of the people in SADC are living be-
low the poverty line. Per capita incomes are 
highly unequally distributed within the SADC 
region. An average per capita income of US$ 100 
in the DR Congo is matched by a maximum figure 
of nearly US$ 6,500 in the Seychelles. While An-
gola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zam-
bia range at the lower end of the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI), Mauritius and the Sey-
chelles are some 100 rankings ahead of them. A 
number of countries are marked by extreme na-
tional inequality of income. South Africa in par-
ticular, the region's leading political-economic 
power, is marked by a sharp dualism between the 
modern and traditional segments of its economy. 
Of a total of 39 million people, in this country 
roughly five million only are fully integrated in 
the modern sector. The huge task of capital forma-
tion and economic growth, together with eco-
nomic-social integration of the unemployed and 
underemployed, will long engage the economic 
capacity of South Africa. Its locomotive function 
will therefore be of limited scope. Against this 
background, South Africa will be able to provide 
SADC with support only to an extent supplemen-
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tary to its own development agenda. The smaller 
member states, for their part, are concerned, and 
pressed, to look after their economic and political 
interests in the process of integration. 
SADC members also differ widely in their en-
dowment with natural resources. The countries 
with abundant water reserves include in particular 
Angola, the DR Congo, Lesotho, and Mozam-
bique, while South Africa is the Community's 
main water importer. The conditions needed to 
generate energy at low cost are given above all in 
Angola, the DR Congo, Mozambique, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. When South Africa has exhausted 
its own, at present extensive, capacity reserves for 
generating electrical power, the country could, in 
the longer term, become an important importer in 
this sector.  
 
Abundant stocks of raw materials are found in 
Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe, while Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Malawi, and SADC's island member states are 
considerably less well endowed in this regard. The 
natural conditions for agriculture are favourable 
mainly in Angola, the DR Congo, Tanzania, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe, while in Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Namibia the agricultural sector is submarginal 
because of the arid-soil-climate conditions en-
countered there. Six of the SADC member states 
have no direct access to the sea and are thus 
forced to rely on transportation through other 
SADC countries. For the transit countries, this 
constitutes an additional economic activity and 
source of foreign-exchange earnings. South Africa 
is traditionally also reliant on labour from neigh-
bouring countries.  
Table 1: Heterogeneity of  SADC member countries – selected indicators 
Country Population 
(million) 
Land area 
(km2) 
GDP p.c. 
(US $ / 1999) 
GDP real 
growth p.a. 
(1991-98) 
HDI ranking 
(as of 174) 
(1997) 
Share of manuf. 
industry in % 
of GDP (1998) 
Angola 12,0 1,247 000  433 0,3 160 5,0 
Botswana 1,6 585 000  3117 5,1 122 4,9 
DR Congo 48,2 2,345 409  203 -6,0 141 n.a. 
Lesotho 2,1 30 355  437 6,3 127 17,2 
Malawi 10,5 118 484  182 4,4 159 13,6 
Mauritius 1,2 1 865  3582 5,1 59 24,4 
Mozambique 15,4 790 380  242 5,7 169 10,9 
Namibia 1,7 824 269  1647 3,9 115 13,8 
Seychelles 0,1 455  7346 3,3 66 13,2 
South Africa  39,3 1,223 201  3044 1,2 101 23,9 
Swaziland 1,0 17 000  1255 2,8 113 32,8 
Tanzania  32,1 945 000  243 2,8 156   6,9 
Zambia 9,7 752 614  302 0,9 151 13,2 
Zimbabwe  11,6 390 757  278 1,9 130 15,4 
Source: AfDB, SADC, Worldbank 
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Concerning their medium term development po-
tential, in addition to their different natural re-
source and current factor endowments it is at least 
as important to consider the SADC countries' 
substantial differentials in functional economic 
specialization and structural diversification. The 
potentials of the individual SADC countries offer 
some opportunities for exchange, more extensive 
cooperation, and integration, though the magni-
tude of the chances involved differs clearly from 
country to country. For the most part, however, 
SADC countries are marked by heavy dependence 
on a limited number of export commodities as 
well as on external transfers. Only South Africa, 
Mauritius, and Zimbabwe have a manufacturing 
sector of any significance and, correspondingly, a 
more markedly diversified external-trade sector. 
In most of the other countries, however, two or 
three primary commodities account for over 50% 
of exports. This makes the region subject to the 
sharp, for the region as a whole often asymmetri-
cal price shocks typical for world-market cycles; 
the scope for intra-industry trade is extremely 
limited. In view of this heterogeneity there is very 
limited prospect of substantial economic conver-
gence within the foreseeable future. 
4 Medium-term perspectives of SADC 
as an integration project 
In view of the structural heterogeneity outlined 
above and the lengthy lead times required for 
transformation and economic convergence proc-
esses, a common market with freedom of estab-
lishment for people and firms and a common cur-
rency must be seen as very long-term projects. 
The launching of the SADC Trade Protocol on  
1 September 2000, however, is certainly an im-
portant achievement in the process towards deeper 
economic integration in the region. But de facto 
implementation of the measures has only begun in 
five member states so far (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, South Africa, and Swasiland). If the 
member countries are intent on it, even the im-
plementation of the free-trade agreement will give 
rise to difficulties enough in view of the potential 
stumbling blocks represented by, for instance,  
exchange-rate policy, the formulation and hand-
ling of the rules of origin for goods in cross-
border trade, or the subsidization of individual 
industries in the various countries. 
Implementation of the Trade Protocol, the realiza-
tion of the reforms of SADC's institutional struc-
tures recently decided on, and the improvement of 
cross-sectoral framework conditions will thus 
shape SADC's agenda for the coming decade. The 
following course of events appears realistic: (a) 
implementation of the SADC free-trade area 
within the next 10 years, (b) continuous deepening 
of functional-sectoral cooperation, and (c) gradual 
consolidation of SADC as a supranational organi-
zation with appropriate institutional structures, 
mirroring the step-by-step transfer of member-
state political competences and financial and ad-
ministrative capacities to SADC's organs.  
SADC's development perspectives are largely 
dependent on the potentials and interests of South 
Africa, the region's strongest economy. In view of 
the domestic development tasks facing it, South 
Africa cannot overextend its capacities either in 
financial or in integration-related terms - and this 
goes for the medium to long term as well. But the 
integration process calls for a firm willingness on 
the part of South Africa to accept compromises in 
view of the interests of the whole region. The 
picture is similar with regards to the development 
of regional security cooperation in SADC. On the 
one hand, common security policy is not conceiv-
able without adequate consideration being given 
to the interests of South Africa, the region's cen-
tral stability factor. On the other hand, the mecha-
nisms geared to safeguarding the rights of code-
termination of all countries in the region need to 
be strengthened. South Africa's capability to me-
diate is being called for, as this country like the 
whole region would benefit greatly from a more 
stable economic and political situation. 
Patience and continuity are called for in shaping 
and delivering the support provided to SADC by 
the industrialized countries. Development of in-
ternational regional-integration projects is a his-
torical process that eludes prediction and plan-
ning. The administrations responsible for devel-
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opment cooperation are important players, though 
they are not in charge of the process. Regional 
integration at the end of the day must be based on 
the firm political will of the member states and 
their respective civil societies. Political dialogue 
and continued support offered by development 
cooperation can, however, bolster and strengthen 
both conceptual approaches and the confidence 
base on which regional cooperation depends. 
One fundamental justification for development 
cooperation in favour of regional integration is 
that such efforts can serve to open the way to in-
vestments and projects which because of their 
specific supranational character could not be real-
ized via bilateral development cooperation in in-
dividual countries of the region. It should be 
borne in mind that certain projects, in particular 
infrastructure measures conducive to integration, 
can be carried out even independently of the pro-
gress made in the political integration process. 
There is a large field of activity with high devel-
opment potential concerning the provision of pub-
lic goods on a regional level – far in advance of 
the need for member countries to relinquish sub-
stantial sovereignty. 
5 Level of efficiency of SADC institutions 
The SADC Treaty of 1992 and the progress to-
wards integration achieved thus far have given 
rise to the following regional organs (see Graph 1):  
– regular meetings of the Heads of Govern-
ment and State (summits) 
– the Council of Ministers, 
– the Standing Committee of Senior Officials, 
– the SADC Secretariat, 
– Sectoral Committees of Ministers, 
– Sector Commissions / Sector Coordinating 
Units (SCUs) 
– a judicial tribunal (not yet in operation), 
– the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
(OPDS). 
The SADC Secretariat's executive steering com-
petence is anchored in the SADC Treaty, though 
in practice its competence is often not respected 
either by the member countries or by the lower-
level Sector-Coordinating Units (SCUs). The 
SCUs are currently SADC's executive organs. 
Their competences and agendas are for the most 
part defined on the basis of sector protocols. The 
latter are adopted at summit meetings and require 
ratification of two thirds of member states to ac-
quire legal force. Presently there are ten sectoral 
or cross-sectoral protocols in various phases of the 
ratification process.  
Thus far there are two Sector Commissions which 
are jointly funded by the member countries and 
which therefor are genuine regional organs. These 
are the commissions on transportation and com-
munications, and on genetic resources. The 19 
SCUs5 are financed nationally and report to the 
national sector ministries of their respective coun-
try of residence as well as to SADC meetings of 
sector ministers and the Council of Ministers. 
Their policies and programmes are governed es-
sentially by the Sectoral Committees of Ministers, 
chaired by the minister of the member state re-
sponsible. All projects of the SADC Programme 
of Action (i.e. all projects carried out by the SCUs 
and commissions) must be coordinated and con-
tracted with both the SCU and the sector minis-
tries of the countries involved. The SCUs still lack 
the political competence to formulate regional 
project policy, nor are they adequately staffed and 
equipped for a task of this kind. Their perform-
ance tends to be very uneven, and in some cases 
activities lack proper coordination.  
                                                     
5 SADC member states and sectoral responsibilities for 
SCUs: Angola (energy), Botswana (agricultural re-
search; livestock production, animal disease control), 
Lesotho (environmental & land management; water), 
Malawi (inland fisheries, forestry; wildlife), Mauritius 
(tourism), Mozambique (culture, information & sport; 
transport, communications & meteorology, Namibia 
(marine fisheries & resources; legal affairs), South Af-
rica (finance & investment; health), Swaziland (human 
resources development), Tanzania (industry & trade), 
Zambia (employment & labour; mining), Zimbabwe 
(crop production; food, agriculture & natural resources). 
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The weak points and bottlenecks with which fur-
ther integration will have to cope include in par-
ticular the following:6 
– unclear delineation of competences be-
tween the SCUs and the SADC Secretariat; 
– highly uneven and in many cases inade-
quate staffing and funding of the SCUs; 
– unclear competence and responsibility of 
the SCUs vis-à-vis both the national sector 
ministries and SADC; 
                                                     
6 Chipeta / CSIR / IMANI Development (1997). 
– a large number of SCUs that lack and elude 
coordination; 
– too many SADC meetings, with their ten-
dency to tie down substantial personnel and 
financial resources; 
– a lack of overall control and transparency in 
the deployment of the funds of both the 
SADC Programme of Action and the na-
tional contributions at the secretariat level.  
 
In the SADC treaty as well as in the sector proto-
cols signed thus far by the Heads of State, the 
member states have always acknowledged their 
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commitment to SADC and the Community's de-
velopment as long as this did not imply transfer-
ring substantial political competence to SADC's 
organs. Each of the member states contributes 
equally to the SADC budget, irrespective of its 
population and gross national product. In other 
words, Lesotho pays the same contribution as 
South Africa, even though its GDP amounts to 
only 0.7% of South Africa's. One consequence of 
SADC's general underfunding from member-state 
resources is a dependence on donors: Over 90% of 
SADC's Programme of Action is funded through 
donor resources, the EU and Germany being 
among the largest donors. 
A discussion over whether the Secretariat should 
not be reduced to the status of a purely adminis-
trative organ showed that the member states were 
very hesitant to relinquish sovereignty in favour 
of SADC. This controversy was recently ended 
with the decision to clearly strengthen the Secre-
tariat's political role. In its current state, however, 
the Secretariat is understaffed and thus not fully 
capable of playing the active, i.e. policy-shaping, 
role in the further development of SADC that it 
needs to play. A step in the right direction has 
been taken by creating a special technical unit at 
the Secretariat which is now in charge of the im-
plementation of the Trade Protocol. Moreover, the 
creation of a new department at the Secretariat in 
charge of  strategic planning, gender and devel-
opment, and policy harmonization recently de-
cided upon underlines the willingness to build the 
necessary capacity at the Secretariat to further the 
process of regional integration. 
Despite the currently low level of efficiency of 
SADC's institutions, there is no reason to doubt 
the organization's viability. The successes it has 
achieved thus far are noteworthy, both taken on 
their own merits and by way of international com-
parison. As far as the provision of infrastructure 
and other public goods and the establishment of 
sectoral norms and standards are concerned, a 
broad and fertile field of development perspec-
tives is opening up – even far in advance of the 
need of the member states to relinquish any sub-
stantial sovereignty. As has been shown, SADC's 
"internal" development perspectives are marked 
by a number of economic, political and institu-
tional bottlenecks, but on the whole chances are 
good that the free-trade agreement will be imple-
mented in the course of the coming decade. It 
should not be forgotten that the EU took three 
decades to reach the state of an economic union, 
and SADC is, in its reconstituted form, only eight 
years old. Finally, it must be noted that the repre-
sentatives of member-states are rightly proud of 
what they have achieved thus far and identify 
increasingly with SADC. 
6 SADC's approaches to reform 
In accordance with the Treaty of Windhoek, 
SADC sees itself as a development integration 
community, i.e. its aims go beyond the legal and 
organizational necessities of trade integration. The 
member states' differences in political and eco-
nomic interests have, however, proven so grave 
that it must be assumed that the path to a free-
trade area and, beyond that, the further steps on 
the road to a common market or even a customs 
union will not be without setbacks. Due to exist-
ing controversy over the direction and time frame 
for the overdue reforms of SADC's institutional 
structures, decisions on this matter were post-
poned at last year's Windhoek Summit of Heads 
of State. Yet the pressure has been rising, and 
eventually the Council of Ministers made an im-
portant step forward at its extraordinary meeting 
held in Gaborone in November 2000 by approving 
the whole package of reforms. This prepared the 
final breakthrough achieved at the extraordinary 
summit of the Heads of State and Government 
which took place in Windhoek in March 2001.  
The expert-technical discussion process within 
SADC had rendered the organizational weak 
points manifest, leading to the following recom-
mendations for reform:7 
– reduction of the number of projects covered 
by the SADC Programme of Action; 
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– increase of member-state financial contri-
butions to the SADC programme of action; 
– consolidation of the sectoral policies to 
form larger policy clusters covering (a) ag-
riculture, protection of natural resources 
and the environment, (b) development of 
human resources, science, and technology, 
(c) infrastructure, communications, and in-
formation technology, (d) trade, industry, 
finance, and investment, (e) community de-
velopment, culture, and information; 
– harmonization of the role played by the 
SADC Secretariat as an instrument of pol-
icy coordination and strengthening of its 
preparatory work. 
The main pillars of the proposed and meanwhile 
approved institutional reform comprise: 
– Creation of four so-called directorates at the 
Secretariat which will be in charge of im-
plementing the SADC Programme of Ac-
tion; they will cover the following fields: 
trade, industry, finance and investment; 
food security, agriculture and natural re-
source management; infrastructure and ser-
vices; and social and human development 
and special programmemes.  
– The existing SCUs and sector commissions 
shall be phased out within the next two 
years. 
– Creation of a new department at the Secre-
tariat for "strategic planning, gender and 
development and policy harmonization" 
which shall both strengthen the Secretariat's 
executive functions and serve as a think 
tank for regional integration. 
– Revival of the Organ on Politics,  Defence 
and Security (OPDS) which shall now be 
integrated into the SADC structures; the 
chairpersonship shall be on a rotational ba-
sis for a period of one year. 
Moreover, the Council of Ministers has been pre-
sented a proposal on the funding of SADC institu-
tions by means of a tax on private transactions or 
consumption (e.g. a value-added tax). This would 
on the one hand relieve member-state budgets and 
on the other hand ensure that contributions of 
member states are in line with their individual 
economic data. 
7 Obstacles to integration and new 
driving forces  
The most important obstacle to any deepened 
integration of SADC must be seen in the open and 
latent conflicts in the region, in which several 
member states are involved. Thus far SADC's 
security organ has failed in this regard, with Zim-
babwe and Namibia intervening militarily, with-
out the organ's authorization, both in Angola and 
in the DR Congo. The deep internal crisis in Zim-
babwe has become a new test case for the region 
as well as for South Africa's leadership role in 
regional stability. South African president Thabo 
Mbeki has thus far acted prudently, keeping South 
Africa and other SADC countries out of these 
conflicts. In view of the great conflict potential in 
the region due to incomplete nation-building pro-
cesses, conflicts over land, water, and natural 
resources, it would seem imperative to strengthen 
regional conflict-resolution mechanisms. The 
integration of the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security into the SADC structures and the pro-
posed yearly rotation of its chairperson are impor-
tant steps in the right direction. A precondition, 
however, for the safeguarding of peace and pros-
perity in the region is that the populations of all 
member countries gain access to resources and 
participate in political decision-making. 
Many observers conclude from the currently low 
share of intraregional trade in SADC and the simi-
larity of export structures that the potential for 
trade creation is rather low. Data available on 
intraregional trade are incomplete and at times 
contradictory. On the whole they point, however, 
to a rather dynamic evolution of regional trade 
flows, albeit with a pronounced bias towards trade 
among the five members of SACU8 (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) 
                                                     
8 Southern African Customs Union. 
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and rising exports from South Africa to the rest of 
the region.9 The latter were even more pro-
nounced due to the boom in raw materials exports 
between 1995-97 which had an extraordinarily 
favourable impact on South Africa's exports to the 
SADC countries. There is a risk, however, that 
bilateral trade surpluses incurred by South Africa 
become structural and cannot be sustainably fi-
nanced from the foreign-exchange reserves of its 
SADC partners. Looking to its own development, 
South Africa has every reason to stabilize the 
transfers to and foreign investments in its partner 
countries, in this way boosting export potentials 
there. This would go some way towards creating 
the medium-term conditions needed to implement 
successfully the free-trade agreement, seen above 
all in terms of the interests of the private sector. In 
fact, however, South African businesses and la-
bour unions have a different view of the matter 
and are calling for protection of certain industries 
such as textiles and clothing against SADC com-
petition. 
Another obstacle to deeper integration must be 
seen in the fact that all of the countries of the re-
gion are at the same time members of trade 
agreements other than SADC (see Graph 2).10 The 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with its 
common external tariff and common monetary 
policy consists of five SADC members, nine 
SADC members are at the same time members of  
the Common Market of Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Tanzania is also a member of 
the East African Community (EAC, which also 
comprises Kenya and Uganda), South Africa has 
signed bilateral free-trade agreements with the EU 
and Brazil, and so on. These overlapping mem-
berships not only entail multiple costs for mem-
bership contributions and negotiation rounds, but 
involve far reaching technical problems such as 
the application of various rules-of-origin regimes 
which are necessary because of different external 
tariffs of the member countries. Moreover, and 
maybe even more importantly, multiple member-
                                                     
9 von Kirchbach / Roelofsen (1998), Yeats (1999). 
10 African Development Bank (1998), p. 6. 
ships imply a lack of identification with SADC as 
the one integration project. 
While multilateral trade negotiations and unilat-
eral liberalization processes have already largely 
reduced the margins for regional preferences 
among developing countries, bilateral agreements 
such as the EU/South African free trade agree-
ment will probably trigger some far-reaching 
budgetary problems for South Africa's partners in 
the region. The budgetary problems due to reve-
nue forgone from tariffs are expected to be par-
ticularly sizeable in the smaller SACU member 
states. SACU's revenue-sharing mechanism is 
currently being renegotiated, and the EU has al-
ready signalled that it is willing to contribute to 
compensating the weaker countries. The imple-
mentation of the free-trade agreement may entail 
budgetary, fiscal, and competition-related conse-
quences that could also lead SADC into a crisis, 
and will call for countermeasures in the form of 
compensation payments. The negotiation process 
concerning a potential regional partnership 
agreement (REPA) between the EU and SADC in 
accordance with the Cotonou Agreement will 
soon be started, but it will in all probability not 
materialize before the year 2008. The heterogene-
ity of SADC members is in any case a difficult 
starting point for such a regional FTA, and it will 
depend much on the precise conditions whether 
one such agreement can match the interests of the 
whole region. 
A potential new driving force to overcome the 
obstacles to deeper integration which reside in the 
heterogeneity and latent polarisation of industri-
alization in the SADC region are regional funds. 
The experience of the EU indicates that the nega-
tive effects of economic integration on disadvan-
taged, structurally weaker regions or groups of 
countries can at least be partly offset by means of 
a targeted support policy based on such funds. 
Well-managed funds can facilitate processes of 
dynamic social and economic development, help 
to better harness positive effects and integration 
potentials as well as improve the distribution of 
welfare-boosting impacts of integration. Although 
SADC cannot be compared with the EU in terms 
of the initial conditions given in economic and 
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social structures nor in terms of physical and insti-
tutional infrastructure, this may well be an option 
for the region to embark on: a policy designed to 
level playing fields among diverse partners, based 
on  regional structural funds which are jointly 
financed by SADC member states and donor 
funds.  
8 Development cooperation in selected 
sectors 
8.1 Infrastructural integration in SADC 
The SADC countries are relatively closely inter-
linked by a broad rail and road network, the joint 
use of seaports, an integrated power grid, and the 
joint use of watercourses. The community has a 
number of important transportation corridors that 
link landlocked countries like Zambia and Zim-
babwe, with their great economic potentials, and 
the ports of other countries. The biggest contribu-
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tion to the transit traffic within the community is 
provided by the two Mozambican ports Maputo 
and Beira, which each account for roughly one 
third of the overall volume of transit goods. In-
vestments have now been made that could redirect 
a larger share of regional transportation through 
Namibia. South Africa's very extensive high-
tension transmission system is utilized directly or 
indirectly by nearly all other SADC countries. The 
SADC region is drained by fifteen border-crossing 
river basins, most of which are shared by a num-
ber of countries. The most important and region-
ally significant water-related infrastructure, the 
so-called "Lesotho Highlands Water Project," is 
shared by Lesotho and South Africa. Improve-
ment of regional infrastructure and the framework 
involved holds very great development potential. 
It would, however, be necessary to set priorities 
for individual sectors with a view to the relative 
significance of investments. An improvement of 
the framework conditions would also be called 
for. 
Major regional infrastructure projects like the 
transportation corridors have not been restricted to 
the initial efforts aimed at integration. In the fu-
ture, too, promising infrastructure projects will be 
of considerable significance for the deeper inte-
gration of the SADC economies and will mean 
welfare gains for all countries involved. A number 
of both multi- and bilateral donors is active in this 
sector. Aside from the multilateral institutions 
World Bank and EU, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) play an important role in develop-
ment cooperation with individual SADC countries 
in infrastructure projects. On top of these, various 
bilateral donors are also active in the region, 
Germany being one of the most important of 
them. SADC further receives support from nu-
merous multilateral institutions (EU, UNEP, 
UNDP, World Bank / GEF, AfDB).  
Transportation 
The potential for an improved integration of 
SADC in the transportation sector is substantial, 
with transportation costs here being far higher 
than those in other developing regions. This leads 
to higher production and marketing costs and ob-
structs the transboundary exchange of goods. 
Thus, the existing deficits in the transportation 
sector, which SADC can help to overcome, con-
stitute a weighty obstacle to any improved utiliza-
tion of the great potentials of a number of SADC 
countries. This goes not only for exports of raw 
materials to third countries, it also applies for the 
agricultural sector and the trade in agricultural 
products within SADC, a factor of considerable 
significance for food security in the region. 
A number of problems are currently blocking the 
development of an efficient and reasonably priced 
transit system in the SADC region. These prob-
lems include generally inadequate links between 
road, rail and water, insufficient standardization, 
maintenance backlogs, and weaknesses in man-
agement. Road transportation is plagued by over-
loading practices that are harmful to road security 
and the condition of roads; market access for 
transportation companies is restricted, and border 
formalities for the most part lead to long delays. 
Costly bottlenecks can for instance also be found 
in port transshipment capacities for containers. 
Aside from a number of other regional organiza-
tions and associations of the transportation indus-
try, it is above all SADC's Southern African 
Transport and Communications Commission 
(SATCC), with its headquarters in Maputo, that is 
concerned with the development and integration 
of regional transportation. SATCC's activity is 
based on the 1996 "Protocol on Transport, Com-
munications and Meteorology". In the meantime 
some progress has been made in implementing 
structural reforms, in particular in the road sector, 
e.g. the creation of specially earmarked road funds 
and legally autonomous road authorities as well as 
the assignment of a greater role to the private sec-
tor (e.g. management commission, dedicated road 
fund, responsibility for maintenance work). As far 
as railways and ports are concerned, improve-
ments have already been achieved in terms of 
legal and organizational forms as well as in the 
form of a growing share of responsibility for pri-
vate actors in operational activities. There are 
plans to use the so-called Spatial Development 
Initiatives (SDIs) to promote the exploitation of 
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the development potentials offered by major 
transportation corridors. These operate on the 
initiative of the South African government, 
though they also include a major role for private 
investors.  
Improvement of framework conditions plays an 
essential role in the concepts of all major donors 
for the transportation sector. The main donors of 
individual recipient countries in this sector include 
numerous bilateral donors, but above all also the 
EU and the World Bank. SATCC receives support 
from the EU, the World Bank, as well as various 
bilateral donors (including Germany). Since the 
IDA is able to finance investments only in the 
form of credit, and loans cannot be granted to 
SADC as an organization, the World Bank's con-
tributions both here and in its other cooperative 
activities with SADC are restricted in essence to 
technical cooperation and sectoral studies.  
Electrical power 
The percentage of the total power generated in 
SADC and traded internationally is modest at 
present, even though this trade is of great impor-
tance for some countries, notably Namibia, Leso-
tho, and Mozambique. In recent years, progress 
has been made in creating additional interconnec-
tions between national power grids, though the 
integration effects possible here have been ob-
structed by the insistence of most of these coun-
tries on retaining a large measure of self-
sufficiency in energy. In spite of improvements in 
this area, stepped-up private activity in investment 
has been hampered by sectoral regulations that are 
still frequently insufficient. In view of the differ-
ent endowments with energy resources enjoyed by 
the different SADC countries, a greater measure 
of integration could mean cost advantages and/or 
improvement of supply security. 
The now operational energy protocol has placed 
the SCU for energy in Luanda, Angola, in charge 
of these integration efforts. Its activities are sup-
plemented by those of the "Southern African 
Power Pool" (SAPP), whose members include all 
SADC countries situated on the mainland. SAPP 
and SCU hold regular consultations. The main 
concern here is mutual information, but also im-
pulses for the shaping of policy. In technical ques-
tions, the SAPP reaches its decisions without any 
political influence. In the electricity sector, too, 
the World Bank and the EU, along with a number 
of bilateral donors, are the main supporters in 
development cooperation with individual SADC 
countries. Aside from the World Bank, Norway, 
Sweden, and Portugal number among SADC's 
main donors.  
Water 
An adequate water supply is of crucial signifi-
cance for agriculture and rural development, in-
dustrialization, municipal development, and the 
well-being of the peoples in the SADC region. 
The great regional and temporal disparities in 
rainfall mean for some countries a great risk of 
drought and flood disasters. In individual coun-
tries with water deficits, agriculture, promoted 
through highly subsidized water tariffs, is the 
largest consumer of water. This raises the question 
of a different kind of agricultural production more 
in line with comparative cost advantages. A large 
share of the population of the SADC region has 
no access to clean drinking water. The use of the 
watercourses in the SADC region by a number of 
neighbouring countries entails a high level of in-
ternational conflict potential. Growing popula-
tions and economic development will exacerbate 
the water scarcity in a number of countries. These 
include chiefly Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, 
and Malawi. Stepped-up cooperation and integra-
tion could serve to offset supply deficits, lower 
costs, and reduce the risk of conflicts over water.  
Cooperation in the water sector is hampered by a 
number of problems. Apart from insufficient re-
gional infrastructure, these include too little har-
monization of national water laws, institutional 
weaknesses, an inadequate database and too little 
exchange of data on water use and water re-
sources. The SCU for water, headquartered in 
Maseru, Lesotho, is in charge of overall water 
policy. The Protocol on Shared Water Course 
Systems obliges the member states to respect the 
legitimate interests of other member countries in 
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utilizing water resources and to provide for pro-
tection of the environment. While the protocol is 
already in effect, it has not yet been ratified by all 
SADC members. The intention is to create a 
commission or authority for every transboundary 
watercourse. The year 1998 saw the adoption of 
the Regional Strategic Action Plan for the sector. 
One of the larger current programmes is the Zam-
bezi River System Action Plan, which in the pre-
sent phase is developing a management plan for 
the utilization of the waters of the overall river 
system. 
Formulation of national water tariffs for irrigated 
agriculture is of central significance for the sec-
tor's economic efficiency and ecological sus-
tainability. In connection with the harmonization 
of agricultural irrigation policies, it would be im-
portant to do away with government subsidies for 
irrigation water wherever the latter tends to distort 
competition and destabilize resources.  
8.2 Trade integration, industrial 
development, and the role of the 
private sector  
Implementation of the Trade Protocol 
Following month-long intensive negotiations on 
the technical modalities of the Trade Protocol, the 
implementation process was set to get underway 
in September 2000. It is not only for the business 
sector that swift trade liberalization is of central 
significance: Success or failure in this area is an 
important test for the workability and the perspec-
tives of deepened regional integration in SADC in 
general. In the end, the discussions did lead to an 
agreement among the member states, though the 
process once again highlighted the conflicting 
political and economic interests in the region.  
On the one hand, South Africa insisted on compli-
cated rules of origin to protect certain industries, 
which in all probability will cause considerable 
problems for customs administrations and will 
tangibly restrict the export chances of firms from 
the other SADC countries in the lucrative South 
African market. On the other hand, the less devel-
oped members attained concessions for transi-
tional periods for liberalization, for instance for 
textiles and clothing. While this is in line with the 
principle of asymmetry agreed upon which allows 
the less developed countries to liberalize their 
trade at a slower pace than the more advanced 
countries in the region, it has strongly watered 
down the originally planned liberalization sched-
ule, threatening to curtail the dynamics of the 
overall project. Linking further liberalization from 
2006 on to the experiences made during the first 
phase will de facto neutralize the locking-in effect 
of trade integration so important to the private 
sector. 
Potentials and problems involved in trade 
and industrial development  
At the end of the 1990s the share of intra-regional 
trade in the overall exports of the SADC countries 
was roughly 20%, or 4.5 billion US$ in absolute 
terms. This share, relatively high for intraregional 
trade among developing countries, is mainly ex-
plained by South Africa's accession as well as by 
inclusion of the very large shares of intra-SACU 
trade.11 The shares of trade of the other SADC 
countries with SACU, on the other hand, continue 
to amount to no more than 10% on average. There 
are, however, important exceptions like Zim-
babwe which is an important trading partner, in-
cluding in manufactured goods, for several coun-
tries in the region. In general, however, within the 
region SACU exports are growing distinctly more 
rapidly than the exports of the other countries.12 
Whether a broad and dynamic process of trade 
expansion and industrialization will be triggered 
by trade liberalization is difficult to assess, and 
even more so to quantify. All in all, a cautious 
assessment is called for.13 
What would be required here, above and beyond a 
better exploitation of unutilized trade potentials, 
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16 H. Andresen / H. Brandt / H. Gsänger / U. Otzen / R. Qualmann / H.-M. Stahl 
are measures designed to foster industrialization 
in the structurally weak countries and to tangibly 
broaden intra-industry trade. At the outset of the 
implementation of the Trade Protocol, SADC is 
marked by great disparities as regards industrial 
development. The one pole here is South Africa, a 
country with a diversified industrial sector that is 
fighting to hold its competitive position interna-
tionally in technologically demanding industries 
such as automobile-manufacturing and mining. 
The other pole includes a number of mainly agri-
cultural based countries in which manufacturing 
accounts for less than 15% of GDP and where 
exports include a very small number of simple 
manufactured and processed consumer products 
such as food and textiles.  
Trade integration alone will certainly not solve the 
manifold problems posed by the low level of in-
dustrial development typical of most SADC coun-
tries. While an enlarged economic space would 
lower transaction costs and allow for certain 
economies of scale, the problems must also be 
sought at the company level, in the business envi-
ronment and in sociopolitical factors. A comple-
mentary industrial policy would need to reduce 
the supply-side bottlenecks present in all coun-
tries, in this way avoiding a situation in which the 
newly emerging potentials are shared only by a 
limited number of businesses. Regional industrial 
policy should concentrate on those aims and prob-
lems for which it potentially has better solutions 
to offer than national policy approaches: 
– the creation of economies of scale and sco-
pe by means of an increased regional divi-
sion of labour; 
– cost digression and reduction of business 
risks through improved communications 
and transportation infrastructure; 
– dynamic learning effects by means of an 
intra-regional transfer of knowledge and 
technology between firms and institutions; 
– the attraction of foreign direct investment 
and exploitation of the spillover effects as-
sociated to it. 
Trade integration would lead to welfare gains for 
the region as a whole, although, due to the exist-
ing disparities, the distribution of such gains is 
likely to be uneven. The countries with a mature 
industrial sector will benefit most from trade crea-
tion. But chances will also emerge for countries 
and industries which have already reached a cer-
tain technological level and are successful in har-
nessing integration to build scale economies and 
specialization edges, in this way connecting up 
with growth industries with international competi-
tive advantages. This should be possible mainly 
for the smaller SACU members as well as Mauri-
tius. Most of the other countries, however, give 
reason to fear that trade integration will entail a 
regional concentration of industrial investment 
and development within SADC that is unfavour-
able to them and that they will be unable to ex-
ploit existing domestic potentials for instance in 
the processing and exporting of agricultural pro-
duce. While foreign direct investment has thus far 
not reinforced this trend, the better part of such 
investment is flowing into the mining sector and 
thus contributing little to positive spillover effects 
and upstream linkages with small business. 
Compared with South Africa, the competitive 
advantages of the smaller SADC members consist 
in particular in lower wage costs, a factor, though, 
that they can turn fully to account only by import-
ing favourably priced extraregional inputs. The 
greatest potential for trade creation and regional 
specialization in line with comparative cost ad-
vantages is offered by the textile, clothing, and 
food-processing industries. For Zimbabwe, which 
has the region's most strongly diversified indus-
trial sector after South Africa, other processed 
products for regional exports would also be of 
interest; these include metalwork and automotive 
components. It is, however, precisely these prod-
ucts that South Africa, motivated by its own do-
mestic interests as well as by growing unemploy-
ment at home, has classified as sensitive in con-
nection with the talks on the trade protocol; they 
are set to be protected over the longer term by 
tariff and nontariff trade barriers, including prod-
uct-specific rules of origin that favour South Afri-
can intermediary products.  
The existing potentials for trade creation and in-
dustrialization in connection with regional inte-
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gration will not be able to be fully exploited due 
to an unstable framework, high risk costs, and the 
low productivity of many firms in the region.14 
The main reasons for low productivity include a 
lack of technical and entrepreneurial skills on the 
part of management and poor training of labour, 
factors that often pose obstacles to a rapid assimi-
lation of imported technologies and an adaptation 
of them to local needs. In some of theses countries 
private-enterprise thinking still has to be strength-
ened (e.g. in Zambia and Tanzania), and the lack 
of small and medium-sized enterprises that could 
occupy important niches and exploit specializa-
tion potentials, e.g. as local suppliers of larger 
companies or retailers, is striking. Seeing them-
selves restricted in their scopes of action, many 
firms respond defensively to change – above all 
by laying off workers. 
The structural adjustment policies of the 1980s 
and 1990s – with their different levels of eco-
nomic success and social burdens for certain 
population groups – contributed to liberalizing the 
region both internally and externally. This process 
of opening up, which has already increased the 
productivity pressure in the industrial sector, 
should be accompanied by a training offensive. 
But very few of the region's countries and firms 
are pursuing a consistent approach here. On the 
contrary: The region is marked by persistent low 
investments in essential social inputs such as 
training and research as well as in business ori-
ented intermediary institutions. In addition, at the 
company level the high risk of employees acquir-
ing AIDS may lead to cuts in investments aimed 
at worker qualification, a development that in the 
future will no doubt further reinforce the prefer-
ence for labour-saving technologies. 
Current practice of industrial and private-
sector promotion and future challenges 
The SADC institution in charge of industrial and 
trade policy matters, SITCD, headquartered in Dar 
es Salaam, has in the past attracted quite a lot of 
                                                     
14 Bennell (1998), p. 18; Rodrik (1998), p. 60. 
criticism concerning its capacity to prepare and 
implement the strategies called for in this policy 
area. SITCD is regarded as one of the weaker 
SCUs, especially when measured in terms of its 
task of coordinating industry and trade, two core 
areas of regional integration. Moreover, it must 
now, after the fact, be seen as problematical that 
two policy areas so central to the integration proc-
ess were located in Tanzania, a country that is on 
the one hand particularly weakly endowed in in-
stitutional and personnel terms and on the other 
hand itself has little interest in rapid advances in 
these two policy fields. Formally, SITCD is as-
signed to the national Tanzanian Ministry for In-
dustry and Trade. As regards the field of industrial 
coordination, it has proven problematical that 
Tanzania itself has only a very narrow industrial 
sector, and one that is at the same time weighted 
toward the state side. This means that national 
experiences with modern industrial policy here 
are, accordingly, scant to nonexistent. In view of 
the personnel-recruitment and salary policies pur-
sued by the SCUs, it has on the other hand not 
been possible to attract external know-how to Dar 
es Salaam. According to SADC's Trade Protocol, 
liberalization of regional trade is to be supple-
mented via a policy of regional industrial devel-
opment. The only regional programme already in 
operation in the industrial sector is a standardiza-
tion programme. All other programmes are in the 
planning phase and have more the character of a 
list of wishes than of coordinated elements of an 
overall strategy. 
In view of the lack of economic convergence and 
the obstacles that may arise for the integration 
process due to macroeconomic imbalances and 
uneven economic development in the region, the 
SCU responsible for coordinating the finance and 
investment sector, FISCU, headquartered in Preto-
ria, also has a key function. Thus far, FISCU has 
been operating without a protocol, an expression, 
among other things, of the reluctance on the part 
of member states to relinquish sovereign rights in 
the fields of economic and monetary policy. In 
institutional terms, the sector has two committees: 
the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the 
Committee of Senior Treasury Officials which 
comprises several sub-committees such as the one 
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of the regional development finance institutions. 
South Africa has a leading role in all these organs. 
FISCU is based in South Africa's Department of 
Finance and coordinates the work in the sector. Its 
policy is market-driven in principle. While its 
performance, again, depends largely on the will of 
the member states, it will have to be measured in 
terms of the extent to which its regional-
integration efforts in fact reduce or intensify the 
disparities found in the region. FISCU receives 
comprehensive technical and financial support 
from donors, including in particular the EU.  
The four areas coordinated by SITCD and FISCU, 
i.e. trade, industry, investment, and finances, are 
core areas of the development of the private sec-
tor, and close coordination is called for in giving 
them shape with respect to the SADC region. As 
yet there is no horizontal coordination mecha-
nism, though the reform package recently decided 
on calls for the creation of a joint directorate 
which would be based at the Secretariat. Macro-
economic harmonization, financial system devel-
opment, and investment promotion – the spheres 
of competence at present assigned to FISCU – 
should be advanced in parallel with industrializa-
tion to avoid any further growth of existing dis-
parities. Without a complementary strategy geared 
to overcoming the most important supply bottle-
necks, trade integration threatens to further inten-
sify polarization in the region. It is therefore 
highly advisable to merge these coordination ar-
eas, perhaps including a cross-cutting area for 
"promotion of the private sector," and to provide 
the new unit with mandate and competence in line 
with current reform proposals.  
While SADC is committed to a market-based 
industrialization that is in essence driven by the 
private sector and in which the public sector will 
assume the role of facilitator, thus far the practice 
of SADC as well as many of its member countries 
has clearly deviated from this delineation of roles. 
If the private sector is to become a dynamic force 
of regional integration, it will be necessary: 
- to strengthen the role and organizational ca-
pacity of the private sector in the member 
states; 
- that cross-cutting tasks like representation of 
common interests and the exchange of infor-
mation be conducted via regional networks 
between national organizations; 
- to establish suitable cooperation mechanisms 
between representatives of business associa-
tions and SADC institutions; and  
- to strengthen the regulative, market-organizing 
framework and the role of the financial sector 
throughout the region. 
8.3 Food, agriculture, and natural 
resource management 
Role of agriculture in the integration proc-
ess 
The agricultural and food sector, with the eco-
nomic areas downstream of it, is an integrating 
and multiplying factor of great significance for the 
future development of the SADC region15. This 
applies especially for the so-called farming belt in 
southern Africa (the high-potential countries An-
gola, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania), but 
also, in a less pronounced form, for the low-
potential countries of the arid zones; and viewed 
with an eye to the protection and conservation of 
natural resources, this applies for all SADC mem-
bers alike. Seen in terms of its integrative function 
for regional food security, but also in terms of 
incomes, employment, and the environment, 
broad agriculture-based rural development will 
therefore rank high on the agenda of the member 
states of SADC. This is also expected to provide a 
crucial contribution to reducing poverty. 
This view takes on a new dynamic against the 
background of the efforts geared to deepening 
regional integration. It aims at a gradual transition 
from a national-sectoral to a regional-sector-
integrating development16. This will of course 
                                                     
15 Oosthuizen (1998), p. 342. 
16 van Rooyen / Sigwele (1998), p. 49. 
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take some time; no more than hesitant first steps 
in this direction have materialized thus far. A pro-
posal was made to create a regional development 
focus (cluster) for agriculture, food security, and 
protection of natural resources on the basis of a 
reform package aimed at rationalizing the SADC 
Programmeme of Action. This function is pres-
ently assumed by six SCUs working more or less 
independently of one another: agriculture and 
food security; agricultural research and training; 
livestock production, and animal disease control, 
environment and land management: forest and 
wildlife resources; water sector.  
One issue of great significance to agricultural 
development in the SADC region is the question 
of the delineation of roles in public-sector promo-
tion and marked-based regulation. Against the 
background of highly differentiated agricultural 
development spaces, the following strategy would 
be recommendable: Where a highly productive 
and functionally specialized agricultural sector 
has emerged (e.g. commercial farming in South 
Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius), the latter 
should be in a position to purchase agricultural 
services (extension, veterinary, training, research) 
in the market; where we find a dominance of 
small farms under suboptimal economic and infra-
structural conditions, but favoured by good natu-
ral locational conditions, public-sector promotion 
is justified up to the stage at which a self-
sustaining development is possible. The agricul-
ture ministers of the SADC countries will have to 
look into this regulative-policy issue in connection 
with a regionally coordinated agricultural devel-
opment policy. 
The coordinating units, at present organized sub-
sectorally, are seeking to promote cross-sectoral 
approaches, but they lack the competences to de-
velop a regionally coordinated agricultural, food, 
and resource-protection policy. Yet the signing of 
the Trade Protocol, the Protocol on the Shared 
Use of River Basins, the Protocol on the Protec-
tion of Wildlife, and the preparation of the agri-
cultural protocol have amounted to important 
steps on the road to regional integration.  
To what extent it will prove possible to mobilize 
the potentials in particular of the SADC's farming 
belt will depend on the following core conditions: 
- achievement of peace in Angola and the DR 
Congo, 
- further liberalization of the world agricultural 
markets, with the elimination of international 
price distortions which this implies, 
- consistent implementation of the SADC Trade 
Protocol and an integration-oriented agricul-
tural price, market, and trade policy, 
- successive extension of transportation infra-
structure aimed at lowering transportation and 
transaction costs for agricultural products, 
- harmonization of veterinary and phytosanitary 
measures and adoption of international norms 
and standards in agricultural trade. 
Should these conditions not be met in the course 
of the coming decade, the low-potential regions 
with food deficits will probably find it less expen-
sive to import agricultural produce from outside 
SADC. 
Food and agriculture 
In 1986, on order of the Council of Ministers, the 
Harare-based Sector Coordinating Unit: Food, 
Agriculture and Natural Resources was given the 
task of coordinating, in close cooperation with the 
SADC agriculture ministers, all regional concerns 
and programmes associated with food security. 
But the responsibility for coordinating the subsec-
tors of livestock production and disease control, 
agricultural research and training, and environ-
mentally sound land management remained with 
the SCUs in Gaborone and Maseru, respectively. 
For reasons of development strategy, and bearing 
environmental aspects in mind, all sectors should 
now be viewed under one functional development 
focus, as was proposed by the reform commission 
and shall now be realized in the form of a direc-
torate covering food security, agriculture, and 
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natural resources. Two regional strategies, food 
security and the environment, are mandatory for 
any further development of this focus. An agricul-
tural protocol on the joint further development of 
the agricultural sector is under preparation. The 
SCU's most recent efforts are concerned with an 
initiative aimed at more strongly linking regional 
food-security measures with broad-based rural 
development. This initiative, referred to as the 
Food Security and Rural Development Hub, has 
now been adopted by the SADC agriculture min-
isters; it is also receiving support from the interna-
tional donor community. 
Over 90% of the individual projects of SADC's 
action programme on food and agriculture is fi-
nanced from international donor funds, especially 
from the EU, Germany, Denmark, and the Nether-
lands. At the insistence of the Council of Minis-
ters, the number of individual projects was re-
duced from an original 30 to 11. This streamlining 
is in accord with the proposal on development in 
focal areas (clusters). 
Protection and management of natural re-
sources 
In 1985, on decision of the Council of Ministers, 
the SCU Environment and Land Management was 
established; it is headquartered in Maseru. It has 
created a broad information and data base on the 
state of and the threats to the region's soil and 
water resources. The SCU has furthermore de-
vised the regional environmental strategy, laid the 
groundwork for the Regional Action Programme 
to Combat Desertification, and conducted a great 
number of conferences and workshops on the 
issue of resources protection and sustainable re-
source management. 
The SCU sees its regional field of action as inti-
mately bound up with the Agenda 21 and the In-
ternational Desertification Convention. While this 
has given more urgency to the task of coordina-
tion, it has not made it any easier. The attempt to 
implement the regional environmental strategy 
had been plagued by coordination problems, ques-
tions of competence, and funding bottlenecks. 
Over 80% of the funds for the action programmes 
come from international donors. An action plan 
for the Kalahari-Namib region is being prepared 
in connection with the Desertification Convention. 
The solution of transboundary tasks and the dis-
tribution of the costs and benefits of the action 
plan will constitute an important aspect here.  
Livestock production and animal disease 
control 
While the coordination activities of the SCU 
Livestock Production and Animal Disease Control 
have a SADC-wide orientation, they are not yet 
based on a regional development strategy. The 
latter was to link the promotion of animal health 
with coordination of veterinary control. Thus far 
the main efforts have included special measures 
aimed at animal disease control, immunization 
programmes, and veterinary controls as well as 
training projects for veterinary personnel. The 
ongoing activities are financed mainly via support 
funds of the international donor community 
(Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Japan, USAID, UNDP, EU). 
The subsector's great significance for regional 
food security, the development of incomes and 
employment, and the ecological stability of graz-
ing resources in the arid areas of southern Africa 
will lead to an increase of the organizational and 
conceptual demands placed on the SCU. Regional 
veterinary control will also be faced with growing 
demands. In connection with the implementation 
of the Trade Protocol, i.e. in view of growing free 
trade in goods, it will be essential to ensure com-
pliance with internationally defined standards for 
livestock and beef both within the region and vis-
à-vis third countries. All in all, this means that the 
SCU will have to be strengthened in both financial 
and personnel terms. 
Forest and wildlife resources 
The activities aimed at coordinating and jointly 
further developing these resources are in charge of 
the Lilongwe-based Sector Coordinating Unit: 
Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. The sec-
toral focus forestry is supported in the framework 
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of the SADC Forestry Programmeme of Action, 
while the sectoral focus wildlife resources is fi-
nanced in connection with the SADC Wildlife 
Sector Programme of Action, both of them mainly 
from financial resources provided by the interna-
tional donor community. The Protocol on Wildlife 
Conservation and Law Enforcement, which has 
been signed, though not ratified, by all member 
countries, calls for harmonization and enforce-
ment of wildlife conservation laws, support of 
national and regional institutions, improved man-
agement of wildlife resource conservation, and 
development of efficient regional information  
and communications systems between national 
authorities. 
The development focuses forestry and wildlife 
resources are particularly well suited for purposes 
of regional integration. The reasons are bound up 
with their transboundary character and the need 
this implies to develop a cross-border conserva-
tion area management. This approach to regional 
integration aimed at managing wildlife resources 
should be given continued development-
cooperation support, in particular for training, for 
creation of the necessary base infrastructure, as 
well as at the institutional-organizational level. 
Agricultural research and training 
The SADC programme on agricultural research 
and training is regarded by all member countries 
as an important component of the sectoral devel-
opment focus food, agriculture, and natural re-
sources. The responsibility for coordination lies 
with the Southern African Centre for Co-operation 
in Agricultural and Natural Resources Research 
and Training (SACCAR) in Gaborone; the Coun-
cil of Ministers decided in 1998 to change the 
body's status from that of a commission to that of 
a SCU. SACCAR's main tasks can be summed up 
in three categories: (a) coordination of regional 
agricultural research projects, (b) organization and 
carrying out of education and training courses, 
and (c) documentation and exchange of research 
and training information. SACCAR presently 
coordinates 14 regional agricultural research and 
training projects. These are closely coordinated 
with national and international agricultural re-
search institutions; the latter are grouped together 
throughout the world in the Consultative Group of 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
About one quarter of the programme of action 
coordinated by SACCAR is funded by SADC 
member states, while three quarters of the funds 
are contributed by the international donor com-
munity. The most important donor countries are 
Germany, the US, the Nordic countries, Canada, 
and the EU. On the whole, both SADC and vari-
ous donor organizations see the sector coordina-
tion as satisfactory, though it would be important 
to more vigorously involve the target groups in 
the research and training projects in order to opti-
mally harness results for use on farms. 
8.4 Social development  
Precarious social situation in southern Af-
rica 
Some 40% of the 190 million people in the 14 
SADC countries live in absolute poverty, 30 - 
40% are unemployed or eke out their existence in 
a subsistence agriculture constantly threatened by 
recurrent droughts and flooding. The majority of 
member states have an agrarian structure, with 
two thirds of the SADC population living in the 
countryside and having little or no access to basic 
social services. Income disparities are enormous, 
the Gini coefficient averages somewhat above 0.5. 
Mass poverty, high unemployment, and large 
social disparities both between and among the 
member countries thus pose a great challenge to 
the social development of the SADC countries. 
The AIDS pandemic furthermore threatens social 
and human development in southern Africa in a 
manner typical of warlike conflicts. 
Although SADC aims for far more than integra-
tion via the market, seeing regional prosperity, 
peace, and unity as its tasks, one point high on the 
agenda is an accelerated economic development 
through the creation of free trade. Here SADC is 
following the conviction that, in view of the great 
regional disparities and the generally great burden 
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of poverty, no sustainable social progress is possi-
ble without high economic growth. On the other 
hand, there are relatively narrow limits to an inte-
gration via the market that result from the very 
large existing interregional disparities. The fol-
lowing social trends are impeding the integration 
process: 
– the high losses of trained labour through 
illness and early death due to HIV/AIDS, 
accompanied by a sharp increase in the 
costs for social services; 
– increasing migration pressure (especially on 
the comparatively strong RSA, with the at-
tendant potential of growing social conflicts 
in South Africa); and 
– unadjusted education and training systems 
that, largely out of step with needs, impart 
paradigms unusable in practice. 
The economic integration process will falter if 
fears, harboured especially by the LDCs among 
the member states, are confirmed that the benefits 
of integration will be distributed very unevenly, 
favouring the stronger economies. An accelerated 
social development in favour of the weaker 
economies, financed by regional structural funds – 
provided via transfers by the stronger members as 
well as from donors – could constitute the politi-
cally necessary and structurally sought-for com-
pensation needed for swift trade integration. 
Promotion of human resources development 
(HRD) by improving education and training and 
formation of social capital by strengthening labour 
markets and creating more jobs, development of 
an effective health-care system, and promotion of 
women are seen by SADC as social tasks relevant 
to integration, though the process centers on har-
monization, standardization, and improvement of 
the regional division of labour. 
The practice of regional integration as a 
means of promoting social development 
The SCU Human Resources Development, head-
quartered in Swaziland, has in the past years not 
succeeded in assuming issue leadership within 
SADC in questions of education and training. 
While in some areas concrete progress has been 
made in the cooperation between SADC coun-
tries, the SCU, overburdened in organizational 
and personnel terms, is unable to set the regional 
agenda. The education and training systems of 
most member countries are presently being re-
formed with the aid of various donors, including 
Germany. The larger part of the donors have de-
cided to give priority to supporting national re-
form efforts; at present they attach less impor-
tance to supporting SADC-wide projects via the 
SCU. 
Two community tasks are set to be given priority 
for the future: the standardization in education and 
training required for integration and the activation 
of savings potentials in tertiary education and 
training institutions, including research and devel-
opment, above all in the cost-intensive technical, 
scientific, and medical disciplines. The reason is 
that not all member countries can afford efficient, 
fully developed tertiary education and training 
institutions. On the other hand, theses countries 
must be sure not to lose touch with technological 
developments. If it is to deal appropriately with 
these complex tasks, the SCU must be strength-
ened in political, financial, and personnel terms. 
This has not been possible until present on ac-
count of the manner in which SADC’s organs 
were constituted. 
The employment and labour-market policies are 
administered and coordinated by Zambia's minis-
try of labour and social affairs. The sector first 
came about as a subsector with the SCU Human 
Resources Development and was upgraded in 
1997/98. The sector is governed on the model of 
social partnership by a council of ministers wid-
ened to include labour unions and the business 
community. The financial resources and man-
power at its disposal are inadequate. Three years 
after its establishment it is still in its development 
phase. It is still forced to fight for sufficient re-
sources. The SCU is characterized by its most 
important partner, the ILO, as well as by other 
important donors as weak and not especially vi-
able. The structural problems facing decentrally 
governed sector units are in this case considerably 
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exacerbated by the involvement in them of the 
social partners. 
There is still no protocol for the sector. One is in 
preparation, and current activities are thus concen-
trated on, inter alia, an understanding among the 
member states on internationally agreed-on prin-
ciples, guidelines, and conventions, including the 
core international standards on freedom of asso-
ciation, forced labour, child labour, nondiscrimi-
nation, minimum wages, etc. The Council of Min-
isters has identified a number of regional projects 
to be presented to the donors, requesting their 
support. These are concerned, inter alia, with an 
institutional and organizational strengthening of 
the SCUs, studies on employment and labour-
market policies in southern Africa, support in 
implementing international labour standards and 
complying with the ILO's reporting obligations, 
the development of a database, and support in the 
field of occupational health and safety.  
The SCU on Health was established in 1997 as an 
independent SADC sector under the responsibility 
of the South African health ministry and became 
operational in 1998 in Pretoria. Its manpower 
endowment, at present two senior experts and two 
administrators, is completely insufficient to gov-
ern an exacting regional programme. The ap-
proach to which the member countries subscribe 
is primary health care, which implies the convic-
tion that patients should be treated as close to 
home as possible. The health protocol was signed 
at the SADC summit in August 1999 and the rati-
fication process has been initiated. 
Five focuses for regional cooperation were agreed 
on for the SCU's current programme for the years 
2000-2001: development of a regional programme 
against HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted dis-
eases; monitoring and combating communicable 
diseases, especially tuberculosis and malaria; 
promotion of reproductive health; standardization 
of health-related information; and mobilization of 
financial and manpower resources. In strategic 
terms, the priorities specified by the SCU on 
health are correctly chosen. They take up the most 
pressing regional problems of the health-care sys-
tem and focus on transboundary tasks relevant to 
integration. 
The most pressing regional health problem is the 
rapid spread of HIV/AIDS with its dramatic con-
sequences for the social and economic develop-
ment of the SADC countries. HIV/AIDS calls for 
resolute and coordinated action beyond narrow 
sectoral boundaries. The SCU on Health, in coop-
eration with the sectors employment and labour, 
human resources, mining, tourism, transportation 
and traffic, and culture, information, and sports, 
has presented a regional strategy to combat 
HIV/AIDS that is to be the basis for the regional 
AIDS programme set to be presented to the Coun-
cil of Sector Ministers for decision. 
With an eye to mobilizing the required interna-
tional support for the regional AIDS programme, 
the SCU on Health is conducting a dialogue with 
international donor organizations. The majority of 
them, which have offered substantial support for a 
regional AIDS programme, are, however, increas-
ingly disappointed over the hesitant and ponder-
ous attitude shown by the SADC health institu-
tions. 
9 Strategic considerations on future 
development cooperation with 
regional organizations 
The support of regional integration provided by 
German development cooperation is a means to 
achieving the principle aims of German develop-
ment-policy. This is based on the idea of a close 
link between political stabilization and/or crisis 
prevention, socio-economic development, re-
source stabilization, democratization, and protec-
tion of human rights. 
The strategic role of development cooperation in 
working together with regional organizations and 
their member countries should  therefore involve 
– strengthening such regional organizations 
in dealing with their tasks as supranational 
organizations; 
– promoting the harmonization of the econo-
mies of such a regional organization; and 
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– supporting the member countries in difficult 
processes involved in moving from coordi-
nation of their sectoral policies towards a 
deepening of integration and the implemen-
tation of joint policies. 
Current bilateral development cooperation with 
member countries of regional organizations will 
need to be reviewed with an eye to the increas-
ingly urgent issue of the coherence of promotion 
policies and measures and the need to rationalize 
the cooperation portfolio to fewer but more effec-
tive projects and programmes. Policy mix, de-
ployment of financial resources, and choice of 
instruments of development cooperation should 
therefore be optimized with a view to a decision 
between the bilateral and the regional level.  
Regional integration and support for the organs of 
regional organizations via development coopera-
tion are never an end in themselves. They consti-
tute a means of enabling member countries to 
better achieve, or to achieve in the first place, the 
aims these countries have jointly formulated on 
the basis of regional organizations. As a mini-
mum, they should provide a contribution to sup-
porting sectorally coordinated developments at the 
supranational level and shielding them from the 
dysfunctional impacts of other policies, e.g. exter-
nal interventions resulting in market distortions. 
Common organs of regional organizations should 
act where regional and common programmes 
make possible general welfare gains. This is the 
case when they provide public goods that can be 
handled only regionally (e.g. free trade) or pro-
vide access to goods which have to be opened up 
cost effectively to the region (e.g. scientific-
technical institutions). Application of the subsidi-
arity principle would suggest at the same time, 
that in promoting regional integration, develop-
ment cooperation should in no case acquiesce in 
an unnecessary proliferation of regional institu-
tions. Moreover, the shift of development coop-
eration measures to the regional level should only 
be accomplished once the organs of a regional 
organization have the political mandate and the 
organizational capacity to translate such measures 
effectively into practice. 
A proactive approach of development cooperation 
would, for instance, be to provide technical sup-
port for procedural processes involved in trade 
liberalization decided on at the political level, as 
is the case with SADC at present. In the medium 
term a decision would have to be made on which 
development cooperation projects should be 
shifted from the bilateral-national to the regional 
level with a view to a future free-trade regime. 
These would include mainly development coop-
eration measures that have a sectoral or macro-
policy orientation, e.g. price, market, and trade 
policies. A proactive approach could also be used 
to support the provision of public goods, e.g. by 
means of funding for regionally oriented infra-
structure measures, border-crossing resource-
protection projects, or supranational training and 
research institutions. The regional frame of refer-
ence is also clearly given in the field of measure-
ment, standards, testing, and quality as well as in 
defining critical hygiene norms and environmental 
standards as basic conditions required to improve 
general living standards and ensure the quality of 
industrial and agricultural exports.  
A more passive approach to promoting regional 
integration through development cooperation 
would be to continue with bilateral projects while 
merely gearing them more strongly to a possible 
later integration in the direction of a supraregional 
project. Such measures would include capacity-
building and institutional development with a 
clear view to a step-by-step transformation of 
currently bilateral-national development coopera-
tion projects into projects of a regional character. 
This development should go hand in hand with an 
adjustment of the specific country strategies and 
sectoral strategy papers, which should clearly 
underline the regional frame of reference. 
10 Future approaches to development 
cooperation with SADC 
In development cooperation with SADC the stra-
tegic role of German development cooperation 
should be to support SADC in identifying, con-
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ceptualizing, and, finally, financing and imple-
menting projects which are strongly conducive to 
integration and serve to harmonize the economies 
of the SADC region. Contributions aimed at fur-
ther strengthening the SADC Secretariat in exer-
cising its governance tasks as a supranational in-
stitution are of particular relevance. Cooperation 
efforts should also be geared to strengthening 
implementation capacities in selected sectoral 
policy areas as well as to invigorating the private 
sector and other parts of the civil society. An im-
portant step towards optimizing donor contribu-
tions would be to review the current activities of 
the SADC Programmeme of Action in terms of its 
conduciveness to integration. In view of SADC's 
great level of dependence on donors, an important 
consideration for donor institutions would be to 
proceed cautiously, allowing SADC the time it 
needs for the learning and negotiation processes it 
faces. All activities should include a tangible con-
tribution from SADC itself. 
German development cooperation has so far - in 
an effort that has at times lacked sufficient coor-
dination - promoted development in the SADC 
countries at different levels: member states, SCUs, 
and in particular the SADC Secretariat. German 
development cooperation should be optimized 
with the aim of increasing its integration-relevant 
impacts through firm coordination on the side of 
the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, BMZ, as well as in concert 
with other donors, in particular the EU. Each of 
the different country strategies should include 
statements on the contributions of individual pro-
jects and programmes to regional development. 
They should furthermore be strategically linked 
via a SADC-specific approach. It should be noted, 
however, that only a reformed and more efficient 
SADC could be expected to play the role of a 
strategic partner for German development coop-
eration in southern Africa.  
In keeping with the consultations with the SADC 
Secretariat, the priority areas provided for are 
trade development and business promotion, agri-
culture and management of natural resources, and 
water infrastructure. Additional cross-cutting 
tasks have been specified; they include the build-
ing of implementation capacities among the 
SADC organs (Secretariat, SCUs or preferably in 
the future directorates, and member states admini-
strations), and promotion of staff technical and 
management skills. 
The results of this study confirm the significance 
of these focal areas and their fundamental suitabil-
ity for German development cooperation, al-
though this would have to be reviewed in the light 
of the German government's new strategy of fur-
ther focussing development cooperation. SADC 
was classified as a priority partner, thus the three 
priority areas selected would be appropriate. The 
region's political weight and the fact that six of the 
projected 15 sub-Saharan priority partner coun-
tries are members of SADC lend additional sup-
port to such a classification. 
Given the appropriate preconditions, support of 
social development in cooperation with SADC 
and its member states should play a more impor-
tant role in the future. The region, and thus 
SADC, is practically not sustainable if great social 
challenges such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, pov-
erty, unemployment, labour migration, and educa-
tion/training are not accorded the necessary politi-
cal priority. The SADC's structures can provide an 
important contribution to the harmonization, stan-
dardization, and development of functionally spe-
cialized strategies and programmes. An improved 
and intensified regional cooperation is urgently 
required precisely in fighting AIDS and in creat-
ing effective educational and health institutions. 
In view of the continuing low efficiency of SADC 
institutions, support in the area of institutional-
organizational matters is advisable. But this could 
only prove successful if the organizational re-
forms that have been called for are approved and 
successively implemented, with additional im-
provement to be achieved in the cross-sectoral 
framework conditions. Techno-organizational 
support and SADC reforms will thus have to go 
hand in hand. 
The results of this study further indicate that a 
swift and successful implementation of the Trade 
Protocol would call for development by SADC of 
the corresponding organizational capacities and 
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political decision-making procedures as well as by 
supplementary financial compensation mecha-
nisms. Compensation mechanisms could be set up 
in the form of regional structural funds for the 
social, agricultural, and industrial sectors. How-
ever, such political negotiation and decision pro-
cesses require at least a medium-term time hori-
zon. They could and should be promoted by the 
EU as leading donor in a political-technical dia-
logue, including the conditioned provision of 
funds. 
Since financial-cooperation funds are used to fi-
nance investments in priority areas, there is lim-
ited scope of directly supporting SADC as a struc-
ture in this case – i.e. as opposed to technical co-
operation. Exceptions are those measures accom-
panying investment projects which can also be 
used to strengthen the capacities of individual 
SCUs. Indeed, financial-cooperation funds should 
mainly be used for investments in transboundary 
infrastructure which, as noted above, are better 
supported via SADC than on a bilateral basis. 
Another limiting factor for regional promotion via 
financial cooperation, and thus also a criterion for 
the selection of projects, is the difficulty SADC 
has in obtaining loans. Over the short to medium 
term only the possibility of grants will prove real-
istic. This would be an option in those sectors in 
which special terms can be granted for financial 
cooperation as well as in cases in which the costs 
and/or impacts of a project can be clearly assigned 
to SADC member states that, as LDCs, are gener-
ally eligible for financial-cooperation grants (i.e. 
DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, and Zambia).  
10.1 Future measures in current priority 
areas 
Infrastructure development 
There is a very high potential for further integra-
tion in the transportation sector. The framework 
conditions are improving perceptibly. Promising 
options for technical cooperation should be sought 
generally in further improvement of the sector 
framework. In view of the other existing, and also 
important, focal points of German technical coop-
eration with SADC, the present engagement 
should be gradually terminated over the medium 
term, unless a positive decision is made to provide 
German technical-cooperation funds for this sec-
tor. 
SADC's investment programme in the transporta-
tion sector (including a small share for the tele-
communications sector) specifies 94 projects for 
which funding is uncertain. The overall costs 
amount to around US$ 1 billion. Some three quar-
ters of this is earmarked for reduction of mainte-
nance backlogs as well as for the rehabilitation 
and partial improvement of the design standard of 
regional roads. Roughly one quarter is intended 
for rehabilitation of the railway system, port de-
velopment, and telecommunications projects. 
The responsibility of private actors for the opera-
tion of port and rail facilities is likely to mean 
substantial gains in efficiency. In individual cases 
private investments could also be considered, but 
there will, in general, continue to be a important 
role for financial cooperation to play in this area. 
In the rail sector financial cooperation could, un-
der certain conditions, provide support for a li-
censing or franchising scheme for railway opera-
tions. A particularly appropriate approach would 
be to finance the infrastructure and then to lease it 
to an operator. 
There are more and more private transportation 
companies active in the road sector, and the pri-
vate sector is playing a growing role in the plan-
ning and execution of maintenance work. In gen-
eral, private financing of investments offers little 
promise because of the limited volume of traffic. 
In other words, this field offers some generally 
good points of departure for financial cooperation. 
Before any possible approaches of financial coop-
eration are concretized, it would be important to 
acquire more exact information on planned pro-
jects and the activities of other donors. This 
should also entail a closer review of the priority of 
road versus rail. 
One reasons that speaks for financial support for 
the transportation sector via SADC is that it is 
often not possible to fund regionally significant 
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road and rail systems via bilateral cooperation. 
Moreover, German financial cooperation has con-
siderable experience in the transportation sector in 
southern Africa. Since it is difficult or impossible 
for SADC to obtain loans any funding would pre-
suppose that a project's main benefits would ac-
crue to countries that are generally eligible for 
grants. This in mind, promotion of the transporta-
tion sector by German financial cooperation is 
appropriate if the funds available to SADC in the 
future are increased sufficiently. 
The electricity sector is also a promising field for 
improved cooperation and integration and offers 
particularly good prospects for cost saving. How-
ever, here – unlike e.g. the transportation sector – 
integration is being impeded by the self-
sufficiency-mindedness of many member states. 
Moreover, electricity is less important to the inte-
gration of the economies of the region than the 
transportation sector. Inclusion of this sector in 
financial cooperation could be considered if suit-
able projects are proposed. 
The sustainable use of water resources is of cru-
cial importance to the economic and social devel-
opment of the SADC countries. This field offers 
great potential for intensified cooperation and 
integration. This would entail avoidance or reduc-
tion of conflicts over water. Above all, improve-
ment of the regulatory framework of the water 
sector and promotion of an efficient use of water, 
including the introduction of cost-covering tariffs 
for all users, also offers points of departure for 
further German technical cooperation. The focal 
point here is the commercialization, privatization, 
and liberalization of the sector and the promotion 
of competent regulatory authorities, including 
participation of the various parties concerned. 
This would also concern the watercourse commis-
sions responsible for regulating the transboundary 
protection and utilization of watercourses and for 
harmonizing the framework. Further points of 
departure for technical cooperation might be 
sought in the harmonization of policies and strate-
gies for waste and waste-water disposal. 
Investment projects of regional significance that 
might generally come into consideration for 
SADC funding via financial cooperation would 
include above all long-distance pipelines and wa-
ter abstraction facilities used to deliver water from 
watercourses to the main consumption areas. For 
such projects, funding via SADC as a regional 
organization is often easier than funding through 
development cooperation with individual coun-
tries. However, such projects take time until con-
cretization. Among other things they have to meet 
the criteria of the international donor community. 
An exact comparison of need dimensions and 
existing resources, including less known ground-
water reserves, would be necessary and, in many 
countries, a fundamental change of the national 
consumption framework (i.e. demand-side man-
agement). A further requirement that still needs to 
be met are international agreements on the alloca-
tion of water resources and minimum residual 
water quantities. 
The above assessment of the temporal sequencing 
of different measures is essentially in keeping 
with the programmes of the SCU. For the time 
being, technical cooperation to support the SCU 
and its work should be given priority. No finan-
cial-cooperation funds should be earmarked for 
this sector – which is not to say that financial co-
operation should not observe and accompany 
SADC's further efforts aimed at prioritization of 
the regional support provided for the water sector. 
Trade development and business promotion 
German development cooperation has taken up 
early on the regional approach in southern Africa 
and has for some time now been involved in focal 
areas with two projects the promotion of trade and 
the private sector. The advisory project on trade 
integration with the Secretariat and the advisory 
service for private business based in Zimbabwe 
have succeeded in providing a significant contri-
bution to promoting regional integration and the 
private sector in SADC. Project activities are an-
chored at different levels (from the chamber and 
association level to the national and SADC level), 
and cooperate with other regionally oriented pro-
grammes, e.g. those supported by the German 
political foundations. With the implementation of 
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the Trade Protocol support to these approaches 
should be continued and enlarged upon. 
One factor of great importance to private busi-
nesses is swift implementation of the Trade Proto-
col and, once positive effects have become visi-
ble, further development of the free-trade area into 
a common market, possibly in the framework of a 
customs union. Overlapping free trade agreements 
involving different tariff regulations by contrast 
create uncertainty, increase the costs of trade, and 
impede at present the deepening of regional inte-
gration. If far-reaching trade-diverting effects are 
to be avoided, there is a need for further support 
as regards the impacts of trade liberalization, es-
pecially in the weaker countries of the region and 
in the private sector itself, to help these fully ex-
ploit the newly arising potential. 
The whole range of instruments of development 
cooperation should be reviewed for their suitabil-
ity and the possibilities they provide to better 
promote regional cooperation. In the field of busi-
ness promotion, for instance, this would include 
training provided by the German Foundation for 
International Development, DSE, (e.g. in the area 
of customs administration or tertiary education) 
and by the Carl-Duisberg-Society, CDG, (e.g. 
capacity building for chambers and associations), 
cross-border investment promotion by DEG, sup-
port for regional institutional networks by the 
German political foundations, and so on. 
The focal areas of the future promotion of trade 
and the private sector should include: 
– strengthening the weaker member states in 
developing and implementing strategies for 
a proactive utilization of the effects of trade 
integration; this could, for instance, be a-
chieved via advisory services in the trade 
and industry ministries or by supporting lo-
cal task forces active in implementation; 
– continuing with capacity-building with the 
SADC Secretariat and throughout the im-
plementation phase; 
– promoting cooperation between private- 
and public-sector actors and institutions at 
the national and the SADC level; 
– strengthening private-sector actors them-
selves as regards their organizational 
capacities and improving their skills in 
service and lobbying functions. 
Existing bilateral programmes and projects in the 
field of private-sector promotion should be re-
viewed as to whether it appears feasible to further 
network them and to add on project components 
of regional relevance and orientation, e.g. as re-
gards promotion for micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises with export capabilities, support 
for further meso-institutions with an eye to a 
greater regional orientation or institutional capac-
ity-building (e.g. chambers / local business pro-
motion) in the framework of exchange pro-
grammes. In the field of financial-system devel-
opment, including microfinancing – thus far han-
dled at the bilateral level – the Finance and In-
vestment Coordination Unit (FISCU) might be 
used more in the future to harness regional net-
working potentials. Coordination will become 
easier in this regard once the joint directorate 
comes functional in Gaborone. 
The SADC organs specifically charged with the 
task of creating a suitable framework for the pri-
vate sector (the SADC Industry and Trade Co-
ordination Division, SITCD, and the Finance and 
Investment Sector Co-ordination Unit, FISCU) 
were in the past suboptimally organized and have 
thus far contributed only to a limited extent to 
formulating and implementing suitable strategies 
in the region. Structural reform is now under way 
but it is not clear yet how long implementation 
will take. It is planned, however, that the new 
directorate be implemented in the course of 2001. 
In view of this situation, German development 
cooperation would have the following options: 
– To support all approaches supported by 
SADC members themselves which are ai-
med at focusing competences in trade, in-
dustry, finances, investment, and promotion 
of the private sector; 
– to continue advising the secretariat level as 
implementation and institutional reforms 
get underway, continuing to stress in par-
ticular the concerns of the private sector 
Promoting Regional Integration in SADC 29 
and impacts on weaker member countries; 
it would be important to support the setup, 
and appropriate endowment, of a coordina-
tion office for questions involved in pro-
moting the private sector, located with the 
Secretariat; 
– to aim more to strengthen public- and pri-
vate-sector institutions involved in business 
promotion in weak member states and help 
establish reform-oriented SADC structures 
such as the proposed new directorates; 
– the role of the Secretariat in further concep-
tualizing and guiding SADC's reform proc-
ess will be a prominent one which also de-
serves attention. 
SADC structures have recently been opening up 
for cooperation with the private sector. The 
chances afforded by this development should be 
supported by development cooperation: 
– by using the political dialogue to explicitly 
welcome and continue to call for further in-
volvement of private-sector and other civil-
society actors in the integration process; 
– by supporting the institutionalization of 
cooperation by means of appropriate me-
chanisms and interfaces between SADC 
structures and representatives of the private 
sector and by promoting the willingness on 
both sides to engage in dialogue and nego-
tiations; 
– by promoting the horizontal cooperation of 
representatives of the private sector from 
different countries at the regional level once 
the mandate, the need, and recognizable 
gains have been clarified, e.g. through 
feedback to national authorities and mem-
bers of the private sector. 
The German business community is itself already 
very active in this field, encouraging greater 
commitment in southern Africa via the Afrikaver-
ein and SAFRI. Development cooperation can 
best support these initiatives in cooperation with 
the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
other donors by working toward improved in-
vestment conditions and an environment condu-
cive to private sector development in SADC. 
And in view of SADC's institutional-organizational 
weaknesses, it would be all the more important to 
work for improved donor coordination in the field 
of promotion of the private sector. This applies in 
particular for the EU, the World Bank, and 
USAID, but also for others who are playing an 
increasingly large role in promoting the private 
sector and/or improving the economic framework. 
Donor competition for some partner institutions in 
the private sector is already foreseeable and 
should urgently be avoided. 
Agriculture and the management of natu-
ral resources 
Food security, agricultural development and natu-
ral resource management should make up the core 
of an integrated approach of a regional develop-
ment strategy. It is based on the development ap-
proach of an agriculture-based and poverty-
reducing economic development. In a graduated 
form in keeping with the differentiation of the 
region into high-potential countries and low-
potential countries including countries with food 
deficits in marginal zones, this objective will have 
to be given different concrete shapes. This gradu-
ated approach would have implications for inter-
national development cooperation. The most far-
reaching one would be that the promotion of agri-
cultural development would be concentrated only 
on the countries of the potential zone. Over the 
medium term such efforts should withdraw from 
the marginal zones, or be given a resource-
stabilizing configuration; this should be formu-
lated with an eye to the Desertification Conven-
tion and Agenda 21 and be implemented in the 
framework of subregional resource-protection 
programmes. On this basis, German development 
cooperation should offer conceptual advice to 
support this development focus once the Agricul-
ture Protocol has been adopted.  
Technical support for this development should be 
given in the form of an integrated programme. In 
the countries with agricultural potential this 
should continue in the framework of Sectoral In-
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vestment Programmes (SIPs) underway since 
1996. This is to ensure that development efforts of 
different donors do not unfold in an uncoordinated 
fashion in this sector in a given member state. The 
technical services provided should concentrate on 
the complex issue of how the high conceptual 
demands and the difficult institutional setting 
involved here can be realized under administrative 
structures that are for the most part weak. Techni-
cal cooperation could be used here to provide a 
contribution to strengthening planning, control, 
and institutional capacities.  
The Food Security and Rural Development Hub 
as initiated by the SCU on Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources Development should be re-
garded in the light of the above-outlined inte-
grated programme approach and might possibly 
serve as the starting point for SADC-wide initia-
tive on a regionally coordinated policy of agricul-
ture-based rural development. The initiative 
should in no case lead to a separate development 
project with extensive parallel administrative 
structures. 
Since agricultural development is not possible 
without a functioning road network, transportation 
infrastructure should be further developed in the 
framework of a SIP and tied into the transnational 
road networks. This could boost the anticipated 
growth in intra-regional agricultural trade. Based 
on an overall regional strategy, financial coopera-
tion could be used to provide a targeted contribu-
tion coordinated with other donors. 
In the case of the SADC programme on develop-
ing livestock production and animal disease con-
trol, German development cooperation should 
insist that a regional development strategy involv-
ing a regionally differentiated view be devised, 
followed by swift preparation of the correspond-
ing protocol. Only under these conditions can 
financial and technical support measures be rea-
sonably harmonized. Independently of this, the 
current veterinary control services could be pro-
vided further support. 
The SADC programme on the development of 
forest and wildlife resources is highly conducive 
to regional development. It should in the future be 
supported by the responsible SCU, even though 
the administrative structures are still weakly de-
veloped. This could send a clear signal on the 
promotion of regional integration, which would 
find its concrete expression in the so-called Trans-
frontier Conservation Areas currently under de-
velopment. Together with the private sector, tech-
nical and financial cooperation could provide a 
significant contribution here. 
SADC-coordinated agricultural research and train-
ing is decentrally organized, receives multilateral 
support via CGIAR, and is relatively well devel-
oped. The transition from coordinated individual 
research projects to an integrated research net-
work with clearly defined focal points should be 
supported by German and international develop-
ment cooperation. In the future, however, this 
network should include more private agricultural 
research. Another important factor should always 
be closeness to small farmers actually affected. 
It would be possible to reorient development co-
operation with SADC and its member countries 
on the basis of such a focus-geared regional strat-
egy. On the whole, increasingly scarce financial 
resources should be concentrated on priority areas 
that now can be viewed in a regional perspective 
(e.g. regionally differentiated agricultural promo-
tion). By focusing measures, concentrating fund-
ing, and pursuing regionally differentiated devel-
opment priorities, it is possible to achieve positive 
integration effects on three levels: (a) the level of 
the SADC member countries, with the long-term 
perspective of exploiting comparative locational 
advantages in agriculture; (b) the level of SADC's 
organs, with a view to bolstering them politically 
by strengthening their conceptual competence and 
increasing their develpment capacity; (c) the level 
of international development cooperation, with the 
perspective of simplifying procedures, concentrat-
ing funds, and a reasonable international division 
of labour. 
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10.2 Stepped-up efforts in the social 
sectors 
There is a substantial gap in SADC countries be-
tween the need for social development conducive 
to integration and the actual practice on the 
ground. In view of the great existing disparities, 
regional social development cannot simply be 
used as a lubricant for economic development but 
must contribute to promoting, in the medium 
term, the economic and political integration ca-
pacity of poor member countries and/or regions. 
SADC lacks a comprehensive social agenda that 
accords to solving social problems an importance 
similar to that assigned to economic and trade 
issues. SADC will hardly be sustainable if it, as a 
community, fails to accord the highest political 
priority to the great social challenges facing it: the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty, unemployment and 
labour migration. German development coopera-
tion should emphatically represent this assessment 
in the dialogues concerning these matters. 
Although, in keeping with the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the individual member countries must be 
in the foreground of efforts geared to solving so-
cial problems, SADC itself may have to assume 
facilitative and catalytic roles in view of the 
highly divergent institutional effectiveness of its 
individual members. The organization could con-
tribute to focusing the forces of government and 
civil society and see to it that successful and 
promising approaches are implemented as swiftly 
as possible, taking advantage of possible regional 
economies of scale. For the donors this means that 
they, for their part, will have to aim for more co-
ordination of their individual efforts both among 
one another and with SADC. 
German development cooperation has decided not 
to include social development as an explicit prior-
ity in its cooperation programme with SADC so 
far, instead addressing social issues in the frame-
work of the bilateral country programmes. Since 
the present SADC recipient structure is very weak 
in the social sectors, this decision should not be 
revised until structures emerge that are more effi-
cient and conductive to integration. But as soon as 
that is the case, SADC should be provided with 
development-cooperation support in the field of 
social development as well. 
In the social sectors German technical cooperation 
might best concentrate on organizational devel-
opment as a means of contributing to building 
effective and efficient regional structures and 
strengthening implementation capacities. Should 
SADC decide to set up a (compensatory) social 
fund that appears capable of funding projects in 
the weak member states, involvement of German 
financial cooperation should be taken into consid-
eration. 
10.3 Further contributions to improving 
the cross-sectoral framework  
The possibility of creating a regional compensa-
tion fund that could provide stopgap loans and 
budgetary aids to weak member countries that fear 
losses of customs revenues in connection with 
SADC trade integration (especially Malawi, Mo-
zambique, and Zambia, but also Zimbabwe) 
should be looked into. An initiative of this sort 
would be suited to eliminating the most difficult 
political obstacles to swift and effective trade 
integration. 
SADC trade integration on its own is unlikely to 
reduce poverty by increasing employment in the 
weak member countries. Measures geared to re-
ducing supply-side bottlenecks must be used as 
supplementary measures to promote trade integra-
tion. These should enable weak member countries 
to expand the production of tradable goods. It is 
only in this way that these countries will be able 
to benefit from the potential of increased intra-
regional trade created through trade integration. 
Measures funded from a regional structural fund 
and geared to strengthening agriculture in the 
potential countries as well as a broad-based indus-
trialization process throughout SADC could be 
pursued towards this end. This would, however, 
entail problems involving provision of funds as 
well as decision and allocation modalities. A re-
gional development bank similar to the DBSA, 
but with a special mandate for SADC, would have 
to be in charge of fund administration. Following 
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some preliminary conceptual work (with SADC, 
SADC member states, EU), German development 
cooperation should work toward the establishment 
of a regional fund and forward this idea of a com-
pensation-type fund in the policy dialogue on and 
with SADC. As a leading donor, the EU could 
make use of its own relevant experience in the 
field. As a means of boosting regional solidarity 
and ownership, it would be important to urge from 
the very outset that SADC members assume sub-
stantial shares of the refinancing burden in keep-
ing with their economic strength. The regional 
social fund should be administered by the pro-
posed directorate on social and human develop-
ment and special programmes, which would in 
turn be accountable to the SADC Secretariat. 
German cooperation with SADC cannot be 
viewed in isolation; it must be optimally coordi-
nated with that of other donors. This applies in 
particular for the EU's cooperation with SADC, 
especially since the EU provides the most impor-
tant financial contribution of all donors to the 
SADC Programme of Action. The strategy of 
German cooperation should mesh as far as possi-
ble with the EU's strategy and proceed on the 
basis of a division of labour. To better meet this 
aim, it should be ensured that BMZ, KfW, and 
GTZ are represented in the EU-SADC consulta-
tions. A substantial contribution and ownership of 
the integration process by SADC members, with-
out which there is unlikely to be any SADC inte-
gration, can be ensured only if the donors do not 
compete against one another in financing projects. 
The present donor competition in financing SADC 
projects and activities runs counter to the goals of 
SADC integration. 
For historical reasons, SADC bears the marks of a 
government initiative. In fact, however, integra-
tion will become a social and economic reality 
only to the extent that it enjoys the support of the 
population. The idea of SADC integration, 
though, is still very weakly anchored in civil soci-
ety and the private sector throughout the region. 
SADC integration should therefore be widened to 
include a catalogue of measures to be imple-
mented via NGOs, church organizations, political 
foundations, professional organizations etc.  
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